Tuvalu’s Survival and Adaptation Strategies:  Critically Evaluated Through a Human Security Lens

By critically evaluating Tuvalu’s transition from physical land reclamation to digital statehood and a strategic union with Australia, this paper exposes the precarious tension between securing the nation's political survival and addressing the immediate human security needs of its vulnerable popula

Introduction

Tuvalu is a nation located in the Pacific, which, due to climate change, is facing critical challenges, one of the biggest being rising sea levels. The average height of Tuvalu is approximately two meters above sea, and the highest point is not even 5 meters high, thus sea water is already able to penetrate the soil in many places, making food production and drinking water unsustainable (Tuvalu Government’s Ministry of Justice, n.d.). It is further estimated that already by 2050, half the capital, Fogadale, will be submerged by tidal water levels (Webb et al., 2023). Further, Tuvalu is classified as a Fragile and Conflict-Affected State due to its institutional and economic fragility.

In response, the government has put forth a National Strategy spanning from 2021 to 2030. This framework aims to develop resilience, including strategies such as land reclamation and rehabilitation programmes designed for a worst-case scenario, which in this case means a one meter rise in sea levels by the year 2100. It also addresses the fact that funding must be secured from the global climate financing facilities, as well as the need to develop new frameworks for disaster and resilience management  (Adb.org, 2021). However, despite these initiatives, there is a growing concern that such in situ adaptations might be destined to fail, which calls for alternative strategies.

In 2022, at COP27, in response to the rising sea levels, Tuvalu’s Foreign Minister Simon Kofe announced that the nation of Tuvalu would become the first nation state digitised online in the metaverse (a virtual reality space) (Craymer, 2022). Subsequently, on November 9th, 2023, Australia and Tuvalu signed the Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union, which is meant to safeguard the Tuvalu population even if the physical land would become fully submerged and the country cease to exist. Australia is even committed to aid and work with Tuvalu in its strategies dealing with climate adaptation, building sea buffers and strengthening the coastal buildings to withstand extreme weather events (Conroy, 2024).

However, even though frameworks and new treaties are made, issues remain for the population of Tuvalu, especially in terms of human security, but also in terms of concrete actions in order to preserve the physical land of Tuvalu. Tuvalu’s Prime Minister, at the UN Climate Summit 2025, said that “adaptation could not become yet another catalogue of promises; it had to be a turning point that bridged plans to protection and transformed pledges into tangible actions,”. At the summit he further focused on the need for more clarity, in order to ensure that the support and aid was “timely and aligned with local needs” (Kumar, 2025).

Compared to other Pacific Island countries, Tuvalu is rated higher than the median in most categories when looking at the Economic and Environmental Vulnerability Index. Most acute risk is linked to the share of its population living in very low elevated coastal zones.

By adopting the Human Security framework, this paper moves beyond state centered ideas of security.

This approach will allow for, not only, a critical evaluation of threats that the population of Tuvalu is facing, but also, critically assess how the adaptation strategies may be more adapted toward state security and risk overlooking the human security concerns. While the state as a political entity is set to endure with these strategies, this paper will assess if the population is set to achieve a life of dignity, without despair nor poverty, or if they merely offer survival for the state itself as it is slowly losing its physical landmass.

Theoretical Framework: Moving from State to Human Security

In the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, a new approach was introduced, as the UN was shifting focus from primarily state security to a broader protection of people. The foundation that this new Human Security framework stands upon is the two pillars “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want”. It is further defined through seven key components: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security (UNDP, 1994, pp. 24-25). The definition was further expanded upon in 2012, when the UN General Assembly achieved a consensus defining human security as: “The right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. All individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential” (UNDP, 2022).

Many of the components are inevitably triggered by events seen in one category. For example, rising sea levels (environmental security) may trigger losses in job opportunities (economic security), which may then trigger the rest of them. This paper will utilize these interconnections that exist within the framework as it evaluates the adaptation strategies proposed by both the state of Tuvalu, but also other international states and organisations as seen with the land/coastal reclamation and resilience.

Current Human Security Situation

According to the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (2025) Tuvalu is among some of the Pacific Island nations that are facing increasing human security challenges. Many of which are driven by climate change. Extreme weather events and rising sea levels, followed by threats to food and water security are some effects that are putting Tuvalu and its communities at risk and thus, displacements and migration are becoming more necessary for survival.

Climate change in itself is not the sole threat to human security, rather it is the catalyst that fuels many other threats. Recognised threats directly linked to human security are many, though it is clear that water and food security may be among one of the more pressing ones. As floods and extreme weather makes saltwater soak up the land from within, growing crops and having access to fresh water is becoming problematic. Many residents of the outer islands have been forced to relocate to the capital island of Funafuti, and this has come with several issues such as resource scarcity and stress to the local infrastructure.

Unfortunately, linked to the issues mentioned, Funafuti has a significantly higher death rate than the second most populated island, Nukufetau. This is, according to health workers, attributed to a dependency on imported, high-fat/low-fiber goods in the capital, compared to the traditional diet of taro root, fish, breadfruit, papaya and coconut still maintained on Nukufetau (Locke, 2009). This dependency may be linked to the fact that sea temperatures are altering not only the fish numbers and sizes, but also the coral reefs, which poisons the fish and consequently those that eat them (Robertson, 2024).

With land and water degradation inevitably comes threats to human security. Every aspect of it is under some sort of risk as they are interlinked and connected. To handle these risks and threats both national and global efforts must be made. If we look at Tuvalu’s struggles we realise that many of the threats are transnational issues. As such, Tuvalu alone is unable to solve them. 

Strategies

Tuvalu’s adaptation strategies analysed in this paper spans from purely state-centric security to the security of individuals. The government is actively pursuing ways to fulfil its obligations to its citizens, though there are gaps and inequalities noted and addressed below. 

It was made clear in the government’s National Strategy that a need to develop resilience and strategies such as land reclamation and rehabilitation programmes was an important step in order to have sustainable development in Tuvalu. Funding was a concern addressed in the document, and in 2022, the government announced that the Green Climate Fund (GCF) is set to provide US$36 million as well as US$2.9 million of co-financed aid from the government itself. These funds are set to build resilience and management in three of the islands. The government is hopeful that this will be a catalyst for future funding (Government of Tuvalu, 2022). One year later in 2023, the Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union was announced, explaining how Australia is committed to aid and work with Tuvalu in its strategies dealing with climate adaptation, building sea buffers and strengthening the coastal buildings to withstand extreme weather events (Conroy, 2024).

The strategy is already fruitful, Tuvalu Coastal Adaptation Project Phase I (TCAP-I), commenced in 2017 funded by the GCF and Australia, saw over 7.3 hectares of raised and reclaimed land in 2024, built for resilience. Phase II (TCAP-II) which began in September 2024, financed by Australia and New Zealand has set a goal of raising and reclaiming a further 8 hectares of land. These projects are joined by other projects aimed to strengthen resilience and the water supply (International Monetary Fund, 2025)

The state’s move toward a “digital nation” status

Despite the above strategy of reclamation, fearing the worst (that most of Tuvalu’s landmass is set to be submerged within a few decades), the government has put forth a plan to ensure that the state's capabilities, such as core governance and administrative systems can be accessed remotely and with aims to fulfill state obligations under international law. It will also ensure that the state remains permanent, even though the landmass may disappear (Varada and KOFE, 2023). This strategy will prevent statelessness, meaning its population will not go without nationality and therefore will not see unnecessary struggles as their political security is secured in many ways.

The strategy builds on dependence, since it is planned for a worst-case scenario where displacement and migration is inevitable. The Digital Nation, while securing political security fails to address many other components, for example health and food security. A state existing merely online will not be able to secure healthcare or provide physical attention nor food and water to a dispersed population. Thus, cooperation comes into play. In order to maintain human security at high levels, new solutions must be negotiated with host countries that can secure the physical well-being of their people.

Whether this specific strategy of a digital nation will safeguard anything more than political security, remains to be analysed in the future and to what extent services will be available online.

The Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union

On November 9th, 2023, Australia and Tuvalu signed the Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union, which is meant to protect the future of Tuvalu’s people, identity and culture. This union means that Australia will legally recognise Tuvalu’s statehood should the worst climate impacts occur (completely submerged land). This is the first time any such binding documents have been made  (Conroy, 2024), and is a great compliment, as it addresses numerous threats to human security than the previous strategy “digital nation”, which only dealt with primarily political security.

As Tuvalu’s currency already is the Australian dollar, it helps the state’s adaptation and access when it comes to remittances and aid coming from Australia. Tuvalu’s economy saw significant decline during the pandemic and is still recovering, mainly driven by infrastructure projects such as the coastal adaptation project. Another factor that benefits its economic gains following the pandemic are the inflow of remittances that helps support households, much of which flows from Australia and New Zealand. Though this work migration comes with some domestic issues such as labor shortages, including from the public sector, which weakens state resilience and capacity  (International Monetary Fund, 2025). 

However, while this union is set to protect statehood (Article 2) and population mobility, healthcare and family support (Article 3), Article 4 is problematic. It highlights cooperation for security and stability and states: “Tuvalu shall mutually agree with Australia any partnership, arrangement or engagement with any other State or entity on security and defence-related matters. Such matters include but are not limited to defence, policing, border protection, cyber security and critical infrastructure, including ports, telecommunications and energy infrastructure.”(Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union, n.d.). This in short means that Australia now has significant power over the foreign relations and strategic alliances of Tuvalu, which is a trade-off as Tuvalu gains crucial protection and increased human security but loses some autonomy.

Critical  Thinking

These strategies mentioned above highlights the sad reality Tuvalu is facing as it is forced to plan for complete destruction of their physical landmass. This paper has identified several threats that the population of Tuvalu is facing in regards to both their freedom from want, by loss of food and water security, and freedom from fear, with the extreme weather risks coupled with threats to loss of their land, forced migration and displacement.

By analysing the two strategies presented in this paper we notice that they are aimed at preserving the state and keeping the population safe should the worst occur, there is very little evidence of any middle ground where Tuvaluans gain aid on a personal level for any damages done by climate change, but rather these two strategies is aimed at state and population survival, with little to no consideration to a good life lived in present Tuvalu. By migrating much of the state governance online with its “digital nation”-plans keeping its statehood intact it may be able to keep true to international law, though very little practical governance will be possible if displacements and migration were to occur. The statehood will however remain and protect the population against statelessness. The population that is forced to relocate abroad will live under the laws of the country where they settle, though with their nationality still intact. This strategy may also falter, as I find no president for any similar case, of course. Yet, the plan forward is a necessary transition in order to secure vital data, and digitise most, if not all, state obligations such as perhaps even passports. As the land is set to be submerged, this strategy will make sure that the state leaves no one behind.

Looking at the next strategy, both Tuvaluan state and its individuals are now relying on Australia for many security guarantees, including aid. Tuvaluans may soon find their autonomy completely gone. The Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union in many regards shows characteristics of neocolonialism, as it trades much strategic autonomy for economic aid and security. The risk is that Tuvalu is becoming a state with little to no say in the international arena (Australian veto power) in exchange for survival. The focus and need for survival may inevitably lead to Tuvalu becoming a vassal state, or even annexed in the future, should the islands endure. However, for a nation slowly set to become submerged, the choice is not really autonomy vs union, but rather extinction vs union, visualising how little tradepower, or choice, Tuvalu have when it comes to negotiating terms.

As Tuvalu is becoming extremely dependent on aid and foreign states for its survival I would argue that the population will live with some degree of fear for the foreseeable future, though able to live with dignity and without despair nor poverty. The strategies are valid in many regards, and will likely secure population survival both short-term and long-term. Should the worst occur, Tuvaluans are likely to become a dispersed community of people living under the diplomatic umbrella of other states, especially Australia and New Zealand, where many already work. 

From the Human Security framework however, these two strategies leave much room for improvement, especially in addressing short-term to medium-term focus on individuals' well-being living in Tuvalu, such as food and water security, as well as infrastructure to handle internally displaced persons, so as to secure any fears and wants as people are forced to relocate. This lack of focus is already evident as mentioned previously with the health crisis in Funafuti. In the end, as the state has focused heavily on future worst-case scenarios, the population is somewhat neglected and are already struggling on the islands today. 

However, the positives are plenty, and the union with Australia addresses some of the shortcomings of the first strategy analysed (digital nation) as it will allow Tuvaluans to live, work and study without necessarily being labeled refugees. The economy is also strengthened by this union, as families gain access to a bigger labor market and gives possibilities to send remittances back home. Further, the union, in article 3, secures education, health, and key income as well as family support on arrival to Australia which address several concerns in regards to human security.

Conclusion

This paper has critically evaluated the adaptation strategies of Tuvalu through the lens of Human Security, showing how strategies can vary in focus from either state or human survival. It has highlighted how the government has adapted and overcome situations, from realising that focus on reclamation may not be sufficient for survival in the long-term and thus developing new plans seen with the Digital Nation and the Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union.

The Human Security framework highlights a divided focus, where the Digital Nation may be more in line with securing the state with political security, while the Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union is catering to both state and human security. The digital nation fails to address both freedom from want and freedom from fear, which instead the union with Australia does well as it secures mobility, health, aid, and security. It does however come at a price, specifically a loss in state autonomy.

The Tuvaluan adaptation plans have moved beyond building coastal resilience as they instead seek to secure and negotiate the future existence of their state and people, as the land may inevitably be submerged into the ocean within just a few generations.

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