Networks, Systems, and Temporary Protection: Drivers of Mobility and Policy Trade-offs in the EU–Ukraine Migration Crisis

The EU's response to the largest displacement crisis in Europe since the Second World War was, by almost any measure, a success, and therein lies its problem: an instrument built for speed was never redesigned for permanence, and millions of Ukrainians now live in the legal uncertainty that followed

Table of Contents

Abstract

This paper analyses the migration crisis between the EU and Ukraine through the combined lens of Migration Network theory and Migration Systems theory. It argues that social capital already in place and established migration corridors were the primary factors in where Ukrainian refugees settled across Europe. These structural factors remained dominant even as host country welfare policies began to shrink. Drawing on Eurostat data spanning 2021 to 2026, the paper traces the spatial diffusion of Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) beneficiaries. It examines gendered vulnerability produced by the martial law framework of Ukraine and rising rates of violence based on gender. Finally, it evaluates the policy trade off between the speed of the initial response by the EU and the durability of the solutions produced. The analysis concludes that, while the TPD provided indispensable and rapid legal protection, it has left millions of Ukrainians in a condition of prolonged legal precarity where they are unable to integrate fully or plan for the future. The paper calls for the development of a long term, harmonised EU policy, created in cooperation with the Ukrainian government, to replace the series of short term extensions that currently define the protection framework.

Introduction

In late February 2022, the invasion of Ukraine by Russia triggered the largest displacement crisis in Europe since the Second World War. Within weeks, millions of people had crossed Ukrainian borders in search of safety. This placed unprecedented pressure on the reception capacities of neighbouring states and prompted the European Union to act with unusual speed. According to UNHCR (2025) data, 5,859,890 refugees from Ukraine were recorded as of December 2025. Yet as early as May 2022, only three months after the invasion began, Frontex (2022) reported that over six million persons had already fled. This illustrates the sheer velocity of displacement in the initial phase of the crisis. In total, the EU granted approximately 6.8 million persons fleeing Ukraine temporary protection status (Eurostat, 2025). This figure reflects a population that is highly dynamic, shaped by circular migration, voluntary returns, and movements within Europe.

The legal instrument at the centre of the response was the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD), activated for the first time in the history of the EU. The directive granted Ukrainians a residence permit alongside guaranteed access to employment, housing, social welfare, medical care, education, and family reunification. It also allowed freedom of movement within and outside the EU (European Commission, 2022; 2025). Together with the open internal borders of the Schengen framework, the TPD created a system within which Ukrainians could move relatively freely. This combination of legal access and structural openness makes the Ukrainian case an important object of migration analysis.

This paper makes three core arguments. First, it argues that migration in this crisis was not random but path dependent. Existing social networks, labour corridors, and migration systems determined where the majority of Ukrainians settled. Second, it argues that gender must be understood as a legally and structurally produced category of risk. Ukrainian martial law, which prevented most men from leaving the country, shaped who could flee and under what conditions. Third, it argues that the TPD represents a deliberate trade off between speed and durability. It provided immediate legal protection but created a fragmented landscape of benefits that has left Ukrainians in a condition of uncertain temporariness. Rather than another extension of a temporary instrument, what is now required is a long term policy developed in partnership with the Ukrainian government.

Drivers of Mobility: Migration Network and Systems Theory

Theoretical Framework

This paper draws on two complementary traditions to explain the geography of displacement that emerged following the 2022 invasion. The first is Migration Network theory. This framework focuses on social capital as the key mechanism driving migratory flows. The theory holds that migration is structured by interpersonal ties, including family relationships, friendships, and community bonds, that connect individuals in origin countries to specific destinations. Crucially, these networks reduce the economic, social, and psychological costs of migration. This makes movement increasingly viable for those who follow. Migrants already settled in a destination function as bridgeheads. They provide information, help secure housing, and assist newcomers in navigating unfamiliar social environments. Equally, these bridgeheads act as filters. They might discourage movement to particular locations by sharing accounts of housing shortages or poor labour market conditions (De Haas, Castles and Miller, 2020; McLeman and Gemenne, 2018).

The second framework is Migration Systems theory. This complements the network perspective by emphasising the structural channels through which migration is organised. Where network theory looks at interpersonal ties, systems theory looks at the exchange of goods, services, capital, and people that develop over time. These exchanges give rise to durable migration corridors. Once formed, these pathways reduce transaction costs and facilitate further movement. Taken together, the two frameworks suggest that the pattern of Ukrainian displacement across Europe in 2022 was not a sudden event. Instead, it was the activation of infrastructure that was already in place.

Evidence: Path Dependency and Pre War Corridors

The most compelling evidence for the path dependency argument is the distribution of Ukrainian migrants before the invasion. In 2021, Poland issued the highest number of first residence permits to Ukrainian nationals in the entire EU. This amounted to just above 730,000, and approximately 666,000 were related to employment (Eurostat, 2026b). This figure is structurally significant. It indicates that by the time Russia invaded, Poland already housed a substantial Ukrainian labour community. This community was supported by administrative and social infrastructure that functioned well. The war did not create the Poland Ukraine corridor; it activated it at scale.

Other EU states had also established connections with Ukraine, though on a smaller scale. In 2021, Czechia granted approximately 41,000 first permits, followed by Hungary, Italy, and Germany. Italy presents a notable case. By 2017, some 238,000 Ukrainians were resident in the country. This was a legacy community built largely through migration in domestic and care sectors. Germany, with 224,000 Ukrainian residents in 2017, similarly possessed a substantial pre war network.

This infrastructure helps explain the initial distribution of TPD beneficiaries. Data from March 2022 shows Poland registering 675,085 TPD holders, the largest figure in the EU. Czechia followed with 244,650 and Slovakia with 58,750 (Eurostat, 2022). Adjusted for population size, Czechia recorded the highest rate at 22.9 recipients per 1,000 inhabitants. This is consistent with a strong network effect. By June 2022, Poland had reached approximately 1.2 million TPD holders and Germany began to grow rapidly. In January 2023, the population in Poland declined while the population in Germany rose. This suggests that Poland reached an absorption threshold, after which Ukrainians moved onward. Germany emerged as the primary secondary destination. In this reading, Poland served as the primary reception hub and a transit bridge for movement to the wider EU.

The Unexpected Irish Case

Ireland is an intriguing deviation from network theory. The latest data records approximately 118,000 persons holding protection status in Ireland as of November 2025. This yields a ratio of over 21 per 1,000 inhabitants. This places Ireland among only five EU states with a ratio exceeding 20 per 1,000. What distinguishes Ireland is the absence of a pre war connection. Ireland ranked twenty fifth among EU states for permits issued to Ukrainians in 2021. The steady nature of growth in Ireland suggests a cumulative network effect. Early arrivals who had positive experiences shared that feedback, gradually attracting more people. A plausible factor is linguistic. Many Ukrainians possess functional literacy in English. Research indicates that approximately 23% of Ukrainians are able to read, speak, and write in English, with the figure rising to 39.2% among those aged 18 to 29 (Yashnyk, 2022). For refugees navigating an unfamiliar environment, lower language barriers reduce psychological costs. This may help explain why Ireland emerged as a significant destination.

Theoretical Limits: The Italian Contradiction

The Italian case exposes a limit to these frameworks. In 2017, Italy had more Ukrainians resident in the country than Germany. Based on theory, Italy should have functioned as a strong attractor. Instead, as of 2025, fewer than 59,000 Ukrainians held temporary protection in Italy (Eurostat, 2025). This figure is dwarfed by the 1.2 million in Germany. This discrepancy demands explanation. First, the community in Italy was concentrated in domestic and care work. This sector offers poor employment stability and may have discouraged others. Second, the reception system in Italy has faced challenges in absorbing large numbers. Third, the geography of fear in the first weeks led people to prioritise proximity. Ukrainians may have chosen closer countries over Italy. This shows that social capital is necessary but not sufficient. Capacity and economic opportunity also matter.

Vulnerability, Gender, and the Architecture of Displacement

Vulnerability is often treated as a natural attribute of women or children. This paper argues that vulnerability is a product of legal and structural conditions. In the Ukrainian crisis, this distinction has consequences for understanding who fled and what they faced.

Martial Law and the Legal Production of Migration

The martial law framework of Ukraine prohibited most men between the ages of 18 and 60 from leaving the country (DopomohaUA, 2022). This is the single most important factor shaping the demographics of displacement. According to Eurostat (2026), adult women account for approximately 44% of all TPD holders, while adult men represent only around 25%.

In the early weeks, 54% of Ukrainians granted TPD in Poland were children. These figures are a direct consequence of a legal framework that made flight led by females the only available route to safety. Men were not absent; they were legally prohibited from leaving. As a result, women who fled bore full responsibility for the care of children and elderly relatives. They arrived as the sole heads of households, often without language skills or professional qualifications recognised in the host country. This represents a form of structural overload that the TPD was poorly designed to address.

Violence Based on Gender and Protection Failures

Violence based on gender represents another dimension of vulnerability. According to UN Women (2025), rates of such violence in Ukraine had risen by 36% since 2022. These figures reflect conditions both inside Ukraine and in displacement contexts. Economic precarity and overcrowded housing are known risk factors for trafficking and partner violence. A survey by the European Union Agency for Asylum (2022) confirms that fear of sexual violence was a primary motivation for women fleeing Ukraine. For women who remained in Ukraine, the situation has demanded extraordinary resilience. Grassroots organisations have led much of the response. However, structural deficits remain. Adequate funding for NGOs working on prevention must be an integral part of the response by the EU.

The Policy Trade Off: Speed and the Problem of Permanence

The TPD was designed as an emergency instrument. It was intended to provide rapid protection without the intensive assessment required for refugees. In this objective, it succeeded. Within weeks, millions of Ukrainians had legal status. However, the mechanism that enabled this speed also created problems. Once member states had adopted the necessary arrangements, the directive provided very little clarity on the specific policies each state should adopt, meaning that the benefits available to Ukrainians varied considerably across the EU, as countries determined the details themselves (European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2022). As the European Union (2022) noted at the time, member states were encouraged to provide broad access to medical care and to affiliate displaced persons to their public health systems, but the full scope of coverage remained a matter for national authorities. This was the fastest path to protection, but it was not a formula for a durable framework.

The result is a fragmented landscape. The rights available to a Ukrainian depend on the member state where they are located. For Ukrainians navigating this system, the variation in national rules amounts to a legal lottery. It is poorly suited to the task of enabling stable integration.

Shrinking Benefits and the Effect on Mobility

This fragmented character became clear as member states revised the benefits they provide. Ireland reduced welfare entitlements for TPD holders. Germany announced similar changes to align benefits with those of other refugees. These shifts reflect concerns about the costs of a long term commitment. However, these reductions have had a limited effect on mobility. Ukrainians already settled in Ireland did not leave in large numbers. This stability is what Migration Network theory predicts. Once social ties and employment relationships are built, economic incentives must be severely degraded before they overcome the inertia of the network.

3.2 The Failure to Transition to Durable Solutions

The most significant failure has been the absence of a pathway to long term legal status. Individual member states have begun developing their own instruments. Poland introduced a residence card valid for three years. Czechia offers a special permit for long term residence. Neither constitutes a common EU standard. Millions of Ukrainians now exist in a condition of temporary permanence. They are protected but unable to make reliable plans for the future because their status is subject to renewal. This precarity has real psychological and economic costs. What is now required is a response that matches the duration of the crisis. A continued reliance on temporary instruments is no longer defensible.

Conclusion

This paper has examined the crisis through three lenses: drivers of mobility, gender, and policy architecture. The analysis reveals a crisis shaped by social networks, legal conditions, and a protection framework that is becoming increasingly fragmented. The geography of displacement was path dependent. Poland and Germany became hubs due to existing networks. Ireland emerged through positive feedback. Italy stayed low despite its pre war community, showing the limits of social capital alone.

The gender analysis shows that vulnerability was produced by specific legal instruments like martial law. This concentrated the burdens of care on women. Finally, the TPD was an achievement of speed, but its weakness is its failure to provide a foundation for integration. Resolving this requires more than another extension. It requires the EU to develop a durable policy framework in partnership with Ukraine that is adequate for the scale of the crisis.

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