Bachelors Thesis

By Jonathan Bjorkman

A Bachelors Thesis written by Jonathan Björkman and Pontus Widne. The Thesis tackles contemporary issues with the European Union and internal organizational conflict.

Bachelor Thesis

How International Organisations handle

internal disagreements over conflicts

Case study: the EU during the Ukraine Conflict

Author: Jonathan Björkman & Pontus Widne

Supervisor: Manuela Nilsson

Examinator: Heiko Fritz

Lärosäte: Linnaeus University

Term: January 2026

Subject: Peace and Development

Level: Bachelors

Abstract

International organisations rely on institutional decision-making capabilities in order to function,

however these mechanisms often struggle due to differing national interests. This thesis

examines the European Union's response to the Russo-Ukrainian war as a case study to

understand how consensus and unity is achieved during security crises. By using a Neoliberal

Institutionalist framework, the thesis' objective is to examine the mechanisms which allowed the

EU to bridge the gap between political will and technical ability. This qualitative desk study

utilises official legal documents from the Council as well as parliament voting records in order to

analyse the shift from crisis response to long-term security strategy.

The findings show that while issues regarding energy dependence on Russia and neutrality

caused division, the Union successfully managed dissent through institutional flexibility. The

thesis identifies mechanisms such as the Silent Procedure, Constructive Abstention, and the

European Peace Facility as important tools for the EU to bypass deadlock. Moreover, the

analysis shows that voting behaviour amongst members of the European Parliament was

primarily driven by ideology rather than nationality. Conclusively, by using the EU and the

Ukrainian conflict as the case study, this study shows how international institutions with diverse

members can manage internal divisions.

Keywords: European Union, Ukraine War, Neoliberal Institutionalism, Security Policy, Crisis

Management

Abstract..

List of Abbreviations...

1 Introduction and research problem....

1.1. Objective and research questions.

1.2. Relevance.

1.3. Disposition.

2. Literature review.

2.1. The EU as a Security Actor.

2.2. Managing internal division.

2.3. Weaponised interdependence.

2.4. Research Gap...

3. Theoretical framework.

3.1. The premises of neoliberal institutionalism.

3.2. Using NLI for this study.

4. Methodology.

4.1. Case study method.

4.2. Data and data collection.

4.3. Research Quality.

4.4. Limitations & Delimitations.

4.5. Ethical Considerations.

5. Findings........

5.1. Timeline of EU actions to the Ukraine Conflict.

5.2. Points of disagreement.

5.3. Different EU member positions.

5.4. Russia and Central European illiberal actors.

5.5 USA and transatlantic cooperation.

5.6 Legal mechanisms.

5.7 Strategic costs.

6. Analysis....

6.1. State centrism.

6.2. Sovereignty as a resource for international influence.

6.3. Predominance of political influence over military force.

6.4. State and nonstate actors organised around institutional principles and entities.

6.5. Mutual interest based on international cooperation..

6.6. International institutions as mediators of international cooperation...

6.7. Peace, prosperity and freedom as the purposes of international institutions.

6.8 Summary to Analysis.

7. Conclusion....

References.

List of Abbreviations

• AfD: Alternative for Germany

•

CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy

• Coreper: Committee of Permanant Representatives

•

EU: European Union

• EPF: European Peace Facility

• EUMAM: European Union Military Assistance Mission

•

EFA: European Free Alliance

• EPP: European Peoples Party

•

ECR: European Conservatives and Reformists

• ESN: Europe of Sovereign Nations

•

FPÖ: Freedom Party Austria

•

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

• INSTEX: Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges

•

ID: Identity and Democracy

• MEP: Member of the European Parliament

• NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

•

NLI: Neoliberal Insitutionalism

• OECD: Organisations for Economic Co-operation and Development

•

PfE: Patriots for Europe

• RCB: Russian Central Bank

•

SWIFT: Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication

•

S&D: Progressive Alliance of Socialists & Democrats

1 Introduction and research problem

International organisations rely on institutional decision-making capacities to function; these

mechanisms, however, face problems when they contend with differing national interests. The

challenges of keeping unity whilst also ensuring effective action are a common challenge in

global governance. This is particularly evident within the European Union as it deals with the

security crisis that is the Russo-Ukrainian war.

The Russo-Ukrainian conflict started in February 2014 with the Russian annexation of Crimea

following the Euromaidan protests, leading to years of protests and conflicts in the border

regions. After eight years, Russia officially intervened in February 2022, sending Russian forces

into Ukraine (Lehkodukh et al, 2023, pp. 753-768).

This escalation from civil conflict to interstate war transformed the security landscape in Europe

and reignited debates about the continent's security policy and its capacity to maintain peace

independently. For decades, the European Union has relied on its partnership with the USA and

NATO to ensure its defence. However, with increasing uncertainty regarding the USA's

reliability, the question regarding the European capacity to defend itself has become an

increasingly relevant political topic (Damen, 2022, pp.1-9).

The Ukraine conflict has acted as both a catalyst and a test for the European Union's internal

cohesion (Handl et al., 2023, pp. 1, 8-9). While this has mainly resulted in a united front against

Russian imperialism, it has also revealed internal dissension due to differing national interests,

such as economic and political ties to Russia. Understanding how the EU deals with internal

divisions offers insight into the strength of international institutions. By identifying mechanisms

allowing for cohesion despite conflicting national interests, the thesis contributes to a wider

understanding of regional governance as well as decision-making during crises.

Despite much research already existing regarding EU foreign policy, a large theoretical gap

exists in understanding those dynamics through a Neoliberal Institutionalist framework.

Macro-level strategy is extensively documented; however, few studies analyse how micro-level

coordination mechanisms like the Silent Procedure function to ensure cohesion when crises

require unified action.

1.1. Objective and research questions

The objective of this research is therefore to examine how organisations such as the European

Union arrive at consensus in decision-making under particular challenges, using the case of the

war in Ukraine. In order to achieve this objective, the study poses the following research

questions:

• How did the EU react to the Ukraine conflict over time, since February 2022?

• Which issues caused disagreement?

•

Which different positions did member states take?

• How did external actors influence the decision-making process?

• How did the EU manage to create unity on policies?

1.2. Relevance

Due to the lack of literature on the topic through the lens of Neoliberal institutionalism theory,

we believe it is important to address the research problems within the topic in order to fully

understand the EU's capabilities of acting like a unified security actor. As world tension increases

each year due to severe changes in the international order and a challenge to established

international law executed and posed by several of the world system's major actors, including the

EU's main ally, the United States (Marchuk, 2020, pp. 65-96), the EU is placed in a unique

security position. For the organization to function as a unified security force, capable of

protecting its members independently of the United States and with adherence to international

law, it is vital to have information regarding how the organisational structure of the Union

functions and how effective it is in its current state.

1.3. Disposition

This thesis is structured into seven main chapters. Following the introduction, Chapter 2 contains

a review of the existing literature regarding the EU as a security actor, challenges of managing

internal division, as well as the concept of weaponised interdependence. It further identifies the

research gap concerning specific institutional mechanisms which ensures unity during security

crises.

Chapter 3 contains the theoretical framework of Neoliberal Institutionalism (NLI), defining the

key premises of the theory. This will serve as the analytical lens for this study.

Chapter 4 details the methodological approach. It explains the use of a mixed-method case study

design, combining institutional analysis, discourse analysis, and roll-call analysis. Following

that, it also discusses data collection, research quality as well as ethical considerations.

Chapter 5 presents the findings of the thesis. It provides a summarised timeline of the EU's

response to the war, the voting patterns on certain key resolutions, prominent disagreements

among member states, and the influence of external actors such as Russia and the United States.

Chapter 5 concludes by detailing some technical mechanisms, such as the Coreper and the Silent

Procedure, which are utilised to facilitate decision-making. Aside from the last, all research

questions are addressed here.

Chapter 6 contains the analysis of the findings through the theoretical framework, and answers

the final research question. It applies the premises of Neoliberal Institutionalism in order to

explain how the EU managed to manage cohesion, interpreting specific actions such as the use of

the European Peace Facility and the mechanism of Constructive Abstention as rational

institutional strategies. In this chapter, the final research question is answered.

Chapter 7 is the conclusion of the thesis, where it summarises the research findings, directly

answers the research questions, and discusses the implications regarding the study of regional

governance and security.

This research beyond the specific European context, holds global relevance for the study of

regional governance. As the world starts to shift towards a multipolar world, regional

organisations such as the African Union, ASEAN, or Mercosur face similar challenges to the EU

regarding the balancing of diverse national interests with the international need for collective

security. The EU in this wider context, serves as an example of institutional resilience. By

analysing specific institutional mechanisms such as Constructive Abstention and the Silent

Procedure, this thesis offers insights into how international organisations can manage internal

dissent.

As world tension increases due to the major global actors going against established international

law, understanding how non-hegemonic organisations can organise themselves to protect

international norms is becoming vital. This study could provide a blueprint for how institutions

can generate a form of hard power through the use of soft power mechanisms, meaning universal

applicability to any region seeking strategic autonomy in an unstable global system.

2. Literature review

The traditional discourse regarding the EU displays scepticism at its ability to assert any actual

hard power. The invasion of Ukraine in 2022, however, has greatly challenged this perspective,

by demonstrating that the European Union is able to rapidly come to decisions regarding certain

policies. However, in the academic world there is a gap in the literature that critically analyses

this decision-making process. In order to understand the reasons for this clear shift, this chapter

analyses the already existing academic literature regarding three key areas relevant to the thesis.

These are: The EU's evolving role as a security actor, the mechanisms utilised to manage internal

division, and the theory of weaponised interdependence.

2.1. The EU as a Security Actor

Traditionally, the academic discourse around the EU's role in global security has been dominated

by scepticism regarding its ability to enforce any hard power, meaning the ability to coerce

another organisation or country into specific action, primarily by using military strength. This

older narrative, demonstrated for example by Manners (2002), argued that the EU functions as a

normative power, that the EU's influence does not stem from military might, but rather their

unique ability to shape a public perception of “normal” within international relations by

promoting democratic principles, the rule of law and human rights. Manners further argues that

the EU's unwillingness to militarise was not a weakness, but rather a unique characteristic of the

union which made it different from traditional international powers.

However, more recent academics have criticised such a view, seeing it as creating a strategic

deficit. Biscop (2019) argued that the EU's reliance on soft power has rendered it too reliant on

the USA for security guarantees. Biscop argued this in 2019, three years before the invasion of

Ukraine yet after the invasion of Crimea. It shows how during this time, the EU was still viewed

as militarily weak and reliant on the US, and provides excellent context for understanding the

magnitude of the shift in the EU following the invasion, which forced the EU to abandon their

passive role. This shift has been outlined in more recent research. For example, Genini (2025)

explains that due to the weaknesses and challenges the Common Foreign and Security Policy

(CFSP) faced during the initial stages of the Ukraine war, the EU was forced to adopt changes to

it to better function in the new geopolitical landscape.

2.2. Managing internal division

Within literature regarding EU foreign policy, the Unanimity Rule often takes centre stage. The

Unanimity rule, which is the fact that in order for the Common Foreign and Security Policy to

take a decision, consensus among every member is required. In theory, this rule ensures that each

action taken has a high democratic legitimacy and in no way overrules the voices of lesser EU

members. However, recent literature has highlighted how this rule creates a huge vulnerability

during security crises, such as the Ukraine war Müller and Slominski (2025, pp. 1-27) describe

the Unanimity Rule as an enabler of soft hostage taking. They argue that the veto power allows

members to prevent collective defence decisions as a way to gain concessions unrelated to the

decisions. This situation exposes the EU to “External Edging”, as discussed by Lovato & Simón

(2025, pp. 813-818). The author argues that the Unanimity Rule is a significant factor in

determining how effectively the European Union can resist external pressures, particularly in

intergovernmental policy areas that are governed by unanimity voting, such as the Common

Foreign and Security Policy or the Common Security and Defence Policy, where individual

states are able to leverage their veto power. This allows an external actor to influence a single

member state for example, Russia or China. This creates a scenario in which external actors

could minimise their costs or maximise benefits by blocking common EU policies from within,

using the targeted member state (Lovato & Simón, 2025, pp. 813-818).

2.3. Weaponised interdependence

The general constraint on direct military intervention has led most literature to suggest that the

EU has primarily relied on its economic power as its main means of coercion. Farrell and

Newman (2019, pp. 42-55, 67-75) put this into their framework of weaponised interdependence.

They argue that in an international and globalised economy, important exchange nodes such as

the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) and energy

pipelines act as chokepoints. Countries controlling these hubs can leverage their control over

them to pressure opponents. In the context of the Ukraine war, Rodrigues Vieria (2023, pp.

642-660) applies the framework to demonstrate how the conflict evolved into a struggle for the

central hubs. For example, the SWIFT financial network was forced to expel Iranian banks from

its systems following the 9/11 attacks (Rodrigues Vieria, 2023, p. 645). Rising states seen as

rivals to the European market, like Russia, have sought to become less dependent on that market

for both exports and imports between 2011 and 2021 which is leading to a more fragmented

world trade between two major spheres, the Euro-Atlantic and the Eurasian spheres (Rodrigues

Vieria, 2023, pp. 646, 647, 660).

This use of financial coercion has sparked debate and concern among EU members and officials.

On one side, policymakers in the US and EU officials are adopting the language of

weaponisation, such as French finance minister Bruno Le Maire, who characterised the Russian

ban from SWIFT as a “financial nuclear weapon” (Rodrigues Vieria, 2023, pp. 645-646). On the

other side, you have EU member states like Cyprus, Italy, and Hungary that expressed concerns

about the potential abuse of financial tools. Despite this, the G7, which has certain key members

like Germany and France, affirmed its commitment to ensuring that Russia is no longer able to

weaponise interdependence of certain resources such as energy. The EU and its member states

have been engaged in decision-making that would create a new financial institution that would

shield themselves from abuse of weaponised interdependence from states like Russia or a

potential non-democratic USA. An example of this was the Instrument in Support of Trade

Exchanges (INSTEX) (Rodrigues Vieria 2023, pp. 652-653.)

2.4. Research Gap

Despite the EU's response to the Ukraine war being analysed in previous literature, a gap

concerning both a political analysis of unity and the technical analysis of how unity was

achieved remains. Literature by Genini (2025), Lovato and Simón (2025) identifies the

macro-level changes and shifts in EU strategy. Similarly, Rodrigues Viera (2023) provides

context on the economic logic of sanctions. However, a theoretical gap remains in applying

Neoliberal Institutionalism to the micro-level mechanisms of crisis management, as traditional

NLI literature often focuses on long-term treaty formation or macroeconomic integration. It often

does not examine how technical, daily procedural tools such as the Silent Procedure,

Constructive Abstention or the European Peace Facility function as a stabilising institution

during high-intensity situations. But these mechanisms are the tools that could alter the

cost-benefit calculations that member states do, enabling cooperation where it otherwise might

fail. Essentially by applying NLI to these specific tools, this study aims to address the gap

between the political will for unity and the technical capacity to make it happen.

3. Theoretical framework

This thesis derives its framework from neoliberal institutionalism theory. Neoliberal

institutionalism is a variant of liberal theory that focuses on the role of international institutions

in achieving collective results. Institutions are defined as stable and enduring sets of formal and

informal rules that set behaviours, limit certain acts, and shape expectations (Forte dos Santos,

2021, pp. 650-655).

3.1. The premises of neoliberal institutionalism

Neoliberal Institutionalism, or NLI, is defined by Keohane (2012) as a theory that analyses the

impact that institutions have on states' behaviour in international politics as well as the incentives

for international actors to comply with treaties and agreements, even without compliance

mechanisms. Forte dos Santos (2021, pp. 653-654) synthesises Keohane's (2012, pp. 126-128)

writings as seven premises. State centrism is the notion that states are the key actors in

international politics. In the European context, cooperation and integration in international

politics result from the decisions and actions of sovereign states that are crucial actors that

participate in and are governed by an agreed international framework. This connects into the

second premise, sovereignty as a resource for international influence. Essentially, state actors

under neoliberal institutionalism do not view their sovereignty as a rigid barrier, but rather as a

bargaining chip to be used in negotiations in order to obtain certain benefits, such as influence

over policy-making. The EU is a clear example of this, where member states either pool or give

up some national sovereignty over specific policies in order to gain greater collective influence

and strength on the wider international stage. The third premise is the predominance of political

influence over military force. This focuses on the institutional agreements that facilitate

cooperation rather than military power. The EU is highly reliant on legalisation, meaning power

is exercised and constrained through precise, obligatory rules and third-party adjudication.

Essentially, the EU favours diplomacy, law and political structures rather than military

intimidation (Forte dos Santos, 2021, pp. 653-654) (Keohane, 2012, pp. 126-128)

This also connects to the fourth premise, state and nonstate actors organise around institutional

principles and entities. This core understanding of neoliberal institutionalism showcases how, if

actors such as states within an organised international framework provide arrangements for

third-party adjudication. It can result in progressive extension of rights and legal protection to the

people of member states within that international framework. For example, the European Court

of Human Rights or ECHR, after being established in 1998, has jurisdiction over 800 million

people within 47 member countries, the International Criminal Court or ICC, the International

Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia or ICTFY, etc (Keohane, 2012, p. 132). Other

examples of this could be the CFSP or the European Parliament. The fifth and sixth premises,

mutual interest based on international cooperation as well as international institutions as

mediators of international cooperation, are closely interconnected with the EU, as they are

essential for sustained cooperation that benefits the most people across member states.

Institutions on an international level have an important social purpose, which makes cooperation

possible. International institutions provide a structured environment that facilitates collective

results and can mediate the interactions between state and non-state actors. This leads to

institutions being viewed as “foundations of social progress” and considered essential for

continuous cooperation. International cooperation is built on mutual interests and exchange. A

side effect of this is that once established, it will be difficult to radically change it or remove it.

The final premise is peace, prosperity and freedom as the purposes of international institutions.

The social purpose of institutions based on a neoliberal institutionalism framework, is to promote

human security, human welfare, and human liberty. This aligns with the EU's core missions,

which aim to end conflict and build prosperity and democratic values across the continent

(Keohane, 2012, pp. 126-128) (Forte dos Santos, 2021, pp. 653-654) (European Union, 2025).

3.2. Using NLI for this study

This thesis applies neoliberal institutionalism theory to the case of EU decision-making in the

Ukraine conflict as a lens for understanding how organisations take the actions of several

independent actors and align them towards common goals. It examines the mechanisms and

processes which enable or disable united decision-making across each level of governance

(Fortes dos Santos, pp. 650-655). In the context of this study, neoliberal institutionalism is useful

because it highlights the internal relationship between the EU member states and how they

negotiate, work, reconcile, and compromise in times of crisis, especially within EU institutions

and programmes such as the European Council or the CFSP. It would also allow us to see the

complexities and the different perspectives or motivations for each actor within the organisation.

4. Methodology

This thesis is based on Bryman (2016, pp. 21-23, 309-313) definition of a qualitative desk study,

with an abductive approach (Danermark, 2002, pp. 88-90). This means that the thesis utilises

Neoliberal Institutionalism as the theoretical framework, breaking down the empirical research

data that others have collected into premises, reinterpreting concepts and information within a

new general conceptual framework.

4.1. Case study method

This thesis uses a qualitative case study approach, with the EU's response to the Ukraine war as

the case. The case study design is appropriate as it allows for in-depth examination of the

interplay between interests, mechanisms, and external pressure (Bryman, 2016, pp. 60-64).

It also utilises a multi-method analytical approach in order to fully critically analyse the full

scope of this case study. These approaches are institutional analysis, discourse analysis, and a

roll-call analysis of member states within the European Union in relation to different resolutions

and discussions.

Institutional analysis is a type of text analysis which seeks to find what incentives are created by

social rules, as well as actor's responses to the incentives. The analysis is traditionally used to

understand the behaviour of decision-makers and their motivations (Hetfa, n.d.). In this study,

institutional analysis is used to analyse the legal and procedural tools used by the EU to

overcome deadlocks. It examines mechanisms such as Constructive Abstention and the Silent

Procedure to understand how the institution makes decision-making possible. The second

analysis used is discourse analysis, which is a way to analyse language in a social context, and

can be applied to different forms of communications (Bryman, 2016. pp. 531-532). Discourse

analysis is used in this study to analyse the narratives and strategies employed in the discourses

of certain actors. This involves examining how actors such as the FPÖ and Fidesz frame their

pro-Russia anti-EU stances and refusal to comply as “neutral” or “peace-seeking”. The final

analysis used is roll-call analysis. Roll-Call analysis can be described as “the use of quantitative

or qualitative research methods to understand the decision-making process behind a legislator's

vote; the reasons and rationale behind that vote; and the implications and consequences of the

vote" (Carvalho, 2011, p. 1485). This thesis critically analyses the voting behaviour of the

member states in relation to certain key discussions and resolutions. This is not only an important

aspect to analyse, but it allowed for additional analytical perspectives when analysing the

European Union's capacity to create cohesion in a time of crisis, particularly with the case study

of the Ukraine war.

4.2. Data and data collection

This study uses several types of primary sources. To support the institutional analysis, the study

utilises official legislative and policy documents from the European Union. Examples of

documents used are council decisions regarding the European Peace Facility (EPF), as well as

official communications regarding sanctions. These sources were primarily accessed via the

EUR-Lex database and the Council's public register.

For the roll-call analysis, data were collected regarding EU resolutions relevant to the war in

Ukraine. The data were obtained from the website HowTheyVote.eu and cross-referenced with

the EU's official open access records. This allows the study to better distinguish between

opposition due to national interest, such as Hungarian oil dependency, and opposition due to

political ideology, such as far left or far right. In order to apply the discourse analysis, the study

uses public speeches and party narratives. Included in this are explanations of a vote given by an

MEP, as well as official discourses of actors such as Eurosceptic politicians.

The primary data are supported by secondary data, such as peer reviewed academic articles,

books, as well as articles and reports from think tanks. These sources establish the framework of

Neoliberal Institutionalism, as well as provide context on issues such as economic impact and

legal complexities.

We mainly use a qualitative research method as is described by Bryman (2016, pp. 374-378),

which is a research method aiming to generate deep insights concerning certain topics, and does

so through engagement with places and social actors. This could include actors such as people,

communities, organisations, or institutions. This allows us to interpret the sources, so they can be

analysed and categorised in order to understand how disagreements between member states are

demonstrated, discussed, and resolved.

4.3. Research Quality

In order to ensure that the findings are trustworthy and factual, this thesis uses source

triangulation, which in this case involves cross referencing different types of data (official voting

records, public speeches) to combat the potential bias of a single source. While a unified press

statement might make it seem like a party is unified, cross references with official voting results

can prove the opposite.

The reliability and replicability of the data is ensured through the use of publicly accessible

primary documents. This data regards the council decisions, legal texts, and resolution votes that

are drawn from open-access official databases such as EUR-Lex, and the Council's public

reliability of the research is based on primary data, which are objectively based. This objective

data mainly is comprised of official legal acts and public record of the European Union, the

documents utilised, especially documents regarding Council decisions and European Peace

facility regulations, represent the verified and finished outcomes of legislative procedures.

Unlike subjective sources such as media reports or secondary accounts, these public documents

provide an objective and legally binding record of EU decisions, which minimises the risk of

relying on subjective interpretations.

4.4. Limitations & Delimitations

This thesis has had to contend with certain limitations regarding data accessibility. Firstly, the

access to certain academic literature was restricted by paywalls or institutional barriers. In order

to mitigate this, the research is heavily reliant on publicly/physically available information.

Secondly, institutional analysis is limited by the nature of the specific data sources. This thesis

relies on primary data from the EU as well as documents to construct decision-making processes;

they do not fully include the backroom deals and other informal parts of diplomacy. To address

this, the analysis focuses on observable outcomes rather than speculating about secret

agreements.

Lastly, the Roll-Call analysis is constrained by absenteeism. Meaning that in certain votes, a

significant proportion of MEPs could not vote or actively chose not to vote. An example of this

is during the vote regarding reinforcing the EU's support to Ukraine (Howtheyvote.eu, 2024),

only 9 out of 21 Hungarian MEPs cast a vote. This created a scenario where a country's official

voting record may not fully reflect the full political distribution of representatives

(Howtheyvote.eu, 2024). To account for this, the analysis explicitly states the absentee rates

when interpreting voting patterns.

There are a few delimitations that this thesis is putting on itself. One of these delimitations is the

use of only three resolutions from howtheyvote.eu. This is because of the amount of very

specific EU resolutions that may not be particularly relevant to the scope of this thesis. One of

these delimitations is the restriction of the scope to the war between 2022 and 2025, despite the

conflict having a larger scope.

4.5. Ethical Considerations

Due to all documents utilised in this study being publicly accessible, there are no ethical issues

regarding privacy.

5. Findings

5.1. Timeline of EU actions to the Ukraine Conflict

The European Union responded swiftly to the Russian invasion. Within days, the Union

condemned aggression, approved a support package of 500 million euros to Ukraine, and banned

transactions with the Russian Central Bank (RCB). On the military side, the EU formed the

EUMAM Ukraine (European Union Military Assistance Mission Ukraine) to train and support

the Ukrainian Armed Forces. One after the other, the EU adopted several sanctions, claiming that

"since 24 February 2022, the EU has adopted 12 unprecedented and hard-hitting packages of

sanctions in response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine" (Press and information team of

the Delegation to UKRAINE, 2024). Furthermore, on the 22nd of June 2023, every member of

the EU granted Ukraine EU candidate status. The following section presents the timeline of the

EU's response to the Russo-Ukraine war by compressing the official EU timelines into four

distinct phases (European Council, 2025).

Phase 1: Economic and Energy Decoupling (2022)

The response since February 2022 has been economic sanctions and energy decoupling from

Russia, where the rapid implementation of nine economic sanction packages targeting key

economic sectors such as aviation. Within days of the invasion, the EU condemned the

aggression, froze economic assets of high ranking officials and key individuals and disconnected

Russian banks from the SWIFT economic system. On February 28, the EU utilised the European

Peace Facility (EPF) to fund lethal military aid due to the fact that Article 41 of The Treaty on

European Union forbids the actual Union from paying for military equipment (Maletta and Héau,

2022). By March 2022, the EU closed its airspace to Russian air carriers and banned Russian

state owned media outlets such as Sputnik and Russia Today to prevent the spread of propaganda.

A notable change during March 2022 was the Versailles declaration, which aimed to decouple

the EU from Russian energy (European Council, 2025). To begin to implement this idea, the

European Commission launched the REpowerEU plan in May 2022. This initiative used the

Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), originally for the COVID-19 pandemic, as a financial

instrument to find energy diversification (EIB, 2025).

A significant strategic shift happened later in 2022 when the European council officially granted

Ukraine its EU candidate member status on June 23rd, and four months later setup the EUMAM

Ukraine which was officially launched in November. Later sanctions and resolutions proceeded

to progressively ban imports of coal, solid fossil fuels, and eventually, in the 6th sanction

package, banned seaborne crude oil and refined petroleum products. This caused an uproar from

key EU member states such as Hungary, Croatia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, and Slovakia where

the EU compromised with a temporary oil pipeline exemption. The EU after this incident

implemented anti-circumvention clauses in this exemption that covered how member states that

benefited from this were prohibited from reselling such crude oil or petroleum products to other

member states or third countries (European Commission, 2022a). Additional counters to the

weaponisation of energy were needed, where the council adopted emergency regulations that

capped gas prices and reduced the demand for it, consequently stabilising the single market

against external shocks from actors like Russia (European Council, 2025).

Phase 2: Military Support (2023)

As the war continued into 2023, the EU's focus shifted towards increasing munitions production

and combating sanction loopholes. The EU adopted the Act in Support of Ammunition

Production (ASAP) to gather 500 million euros for increasing artillery and missile

manufacturing. Political agreements were made to provide Ukraine with 1 million rounds of

ammunition, while the 10th, 11th, and 12th sanction packages combatted loopholes, targeted

circumvention networks and banned Russian diamonds. Financial support continued with the EU

agreeing on an 18 billion euro assistance package for Ukraine's government to continue to

function (European Council 2025).

Phase 3: Financial Architecture and Immobilisation of Russian assets (2024)

2024 was a year defined by the establishment of long-term financial architecture. It started with

the EU launching the Ukraine facility, a 50 billion euro instrument (33 billion in loans, 17 billion

in grants) in order to fund the future recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine through 2027. The

Council of the European Union made a legal breakthrough where it agreed to use extraordinary

revenues from immobilised assets from Russian banks to fund Ukraine's defense strategy, along

with a G7-coordinated loan amounting up to 35 billion euros. Sanction packages 13 to 15 were

targeted against the Russian “shadow fleet” which is a collection of vessels used to evade oil

price caps and introduced a new sanction regime against “hybrid threats” which enables the EU

to address threats such as the undermining of electoral processes, threats against and sabotage of

economic activities, the use of coordinated disinformation, malicious cyber activities and other

sorts of threats (European Council, 2025).

Phase 4: "Peace Through Strength" and Total Decoupling from Russia (2025)

By 2025, the EU adopted a strategy that essentially can be described as peace through strength,

emphasising that any ceasefire negotiation must be accompanied by strong and robust security

guarantees from all actors involved. In response to diplomatic shifts, EU leaders acknowledged

peace efforts made by President Trump but maintained the position that no decision could be

made without Ukraine's involvement. Economic pressure was increased with the 16th through

the 19th sanction packages, which introduced a full ban on Russian Liquefied Natural Gas or

LNG imports and increased focus on the “Shadow fleet” with banning port access to these

vessels. 2025 concluded with a massive commitment in December where the European Council

agreed for a loan of 90 billion euros to Ukraine between 2026-2027, repayment of this loan was

to be done through future windfall profits from immobilised Russian assets (European Council,

2025).

The above timeline shows how the EU's reaction has changed throughout the years, going from

crisis management to structural dominance. The EU transitioned from the early short-term

emergency aid to long-term mechanisms such as the Ukraine Facility, and moved from specific

energy sanctions to a complete ban on Russian fossil fuel. Out of all the responses that the EU

did, the most common and prevalent one was economic and political sanctions against Russia

and other involved actors, followed by military aid to Ukraine through EUMAM, the EPF and

other means. Finally, different loop holes in the sanctions, particularly with the Russian shadow

fleet, were tightened. Finally, the EU condemned and denounced Russian aggression

internationally (European Council, 2025).

A similar summary of the EU actions can be found with Paudel (2025, pp. 14-16, 24-30) who

generalised the specifics from EU sanctions in order to categorise the sanctions by subject such

as economic impact, trade, energy, etc (Paudel, 2025, pp. 14-16). However, despite the great and

overarching scope of the sanction packages and other efforts, the final economic impact on

Russia was mixed. While the EU's restrictive measures did in fact succeed in disrupting Russian

trade, the overall efforts to cripple the Russian economy failed due to Russia adopting a strategy

described by Paudel (2025, p. 30) as “Military Keynesianism”. They increased their military

spending by a significant amount, which led to economic growth and the creation of jobs.

Russian shadow fleets further circumvent the oil sanctions by selling oil to other markets such as

China and India (Kilinç-Ata et al., 2023, p. 385, Paudel, 2025, pp. 26-29). In fact, outside of

economic factors, the sanctions from the EU had the opposite effect on the Russian population

than intended. Instead of creating war-tired people willing to protest the government, their

support for the regime increased, granting greater legitimacy to Putin in what is defined as a

"rally around the flag” effect (Paudel, 2025, pp. 21-22, Herbert, 2022, p. 18). This data comes

from the Levada Center, which is an officially independent Russian research center located in

Moscow (Levada Center, n.d). The sanctions also pushed Russia into further embracing China,

having them replace the EU as Russia's biggest trading partner. This provided Russia with a huge

market for her fossil fuels, as well as a source of high tech items (Kilinç-Ata et al., 2023, p. 385,

Paudel, 2025, pp. 26-29). This demonstrates how despite the EU's impressive solidarity in its

initial response to the war, it has failed to stop the conflict.

5.2. Points of disagreement

There have been a few issues the EU have not been fully unified on in regards to the

Russo-Ukraine war. Sanctions on Russia have in fact been a debated topic within the EU, chiefly

because many European countries relied, and still rely, on Russian resources, particularly gas. As

reported by CREA Analytics (2025), the five largest consumers of Russian fossil fuels within the

EU are, in order, Hungary, Slovakia, France, Belgium, and Spain. Together, these five countries

import Russian fossil fuels worth 44,986 million Euro. In comparison, the EU combined spends

69,771 million Euros, meaning that five countries alone are responsible for approximately 40%

of Russian fossil fuel imports. This is generally reflected in the way the listed countries vote. In

the 2023 and 2024 reports on the Ukraine resolution, which among many things called for

expansion of sanctions on energy such as gas and oil from Russia. For this resolution, 12 of

Hungary's 13 voting MEPs voted against the resolution. In Slovakia, 8 out of 13 voting MEPs

voted against it, which is almost matched by France's 38 out of 72 voting MEPs. The two

outliers are Belgium, where only 5 out of 15 voted no, and Spain where no MEP voted against

the resolution. This fractures the EU when the Union votes to sanction Russia.

This obstructionism was not only limited to EU votes on sanctions, but extended to other areas as

well. An example occurred in 2022, where Hungary used its veto to prevent the adoption of the

OECD Global Minimum Tax directive, as well as an 18 billion euro aid package to Ukraine. By

blocking these proposals, Hungary's veto was used as leverage in order to negotiate concessions

regarding the frozen Cohesion and Recovery funds (European Parliament, 2022).

This strategy of obstructionism was a response from Hungary to the EU's deployment of the

Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation. This legal mechanism allowed the EU to sanction or

suspend payments from the wider EU budget to certain member states that were in breach of the

rule of law. This legal mechanism was used against Hungary, freezing billions in Hungary's

Cohesion and Recovery fund, becoming a point of disagreement (Koranyi, 2025, pp. 1-28).

The most divisive issue regarding the Ukraine war is continued military support for Ukraine.

While a significant majority of the members of the European Parliament constantly votes for

continued and increased military support for Ukraine, a significant and growing minority of

members vote against seen from the political far left and right. This is clearly demonstrated by a

2024 EU resolution RC-B10-0191/2024 (HowTheyVote, 2024), which is a resolution covering

topics such as North Korea's involvement in the war and calling on the Chinese government to

end all military and/or dual use aid to Russia.

The resolution's main points, however, focused on Ukraine and Russia themselves. The

resolution mentions several condemnations and demands by the EU Parliament on the Russian

state which are one, an immediate cease of military aggression against Ukraine, two, a

condemnation of the cooperation between the North Korean and Russian military that supplies

troops to fight in Ukraine as well as Russia's testing of new ballistic missiles within Ukraine,

three, denouncing Russian military supporters such as Iran, Belarus, and North Korea that

actively send direct military support to Russia. Particularly with North Korea's support, the EU

parliament says it further escalates the conflict. The EU considers the Russian war of aggression

and North Korea's participation and nuclear/missile program a grave threat to the international

order. In regards to Ukraine, the EU Parliament voted to accelerate EU solidarity, emphasising

the need for increased and accelerated political, military, humanitarian, economic, and financial

support for Ukraine until the war ends. Also reinforcing the military commitment from the EU

and its member states are needed to meet Ukraine's security needs. The EU Parliament also

reiterated its position that all member states and NATO allies should collectively and

individually further commit to supporting Ukraine with no less than 0.25% of their respective

GDPs annually to further assist the Ukrainian military. The resolution also reaffirmed the EU's

commitment to a just and lasting peace in Ukraine, supporting Ukraine's peace formula as a new

framework for international engagement. In this resolution, 52 members, 23% of voters, voted no

with 9% abstaining. Of a total 719 members around the time of the vote, 142 did not vote, almost

20%. Here, similar voting patterns are seen. Unlike the previous vote, a large majority of Belgian

MEPs voted in favour for the resolution. Around half of the French as well as a majority of

Hungarians, however, voted against (HowTheyVote, 2024).

5.3. Different EU member positions

While votes vary between resolutions, there are visible trends within countries and EU groups

when it comes to their position towards the Ukraine war. Countries with high amounts of trade

with or imports from Russia tend to vote in a more pro-Russia manner. This is shown most

clearly within the voting patterns of Hungary, where the majority of MEPs tend to vote more

pro-Russian. This is shown in resolutions such as RC-B10-0191/2024, A10-0154/2025, and

RC-B10-0156/2025. With the exception of smaller nations such as Malta and Slovakia, no other

EU member has a large majority of MEPs voting in a pro-Russian manner. France is constantly

divided into two, however, in a recent resolution RC-B10-0156/2025, “Continuing the

unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after three years of Russia's war of aggression”, no French

MEP voted no (HowTheyVote, 2025a). The French MEPs who traditionally voted ‘no' voted

'abstain' on this resolution, which is a surprising shift from previous votes.

When analysing different votes, it becomes clear that while a majority of a country's MEPs, with

rare outliers such as the traditionally divided France, vote in a fairly unified manner, it is rarely

the country which is the deciding factor, but instead the political group. Within the European

Parliament, there are eight political groups, where MEPs from member states gather together to

join their voting power. Simplified, the parties from furthest left to furthest right on the political

scale are as follows: The Left in the European Parliament (The Left), a political group of

democratic socialists, communists and far-left parties throughout Europe. The Greens/European

Free Alliance (Greens/EFA), a political group composed of green and regionalist parties focusing

on environmental concerns and social justice. Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats

(S&D), a center-left group advocating social democracy and welfare. Renew Europe (Renew) is

a centrist group of liberal, social liberal, and liberal-centrist parties. European Peoples Party

Group or EPP, is a center right/Christian democratic party focusing on Christian democracy,

conservatism, and pro-European policies. European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) is a

right-wing group with national-conservative and Eurosceptic stances. Patriots for Europe (PfE) is

a newer group on the political right with its origins in nationalist and sovereigntist movements.

The newest and furthest right wing European parliament is Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN)

is the newest of the political parties being very Eurosceptic and focuses on national sovereignty

(European Parliament, 2020)

As seen in several votes, groups vote much more uniformly than countries do. While Groups

close to the centre, such as the S&D and the EPP tend to vote in favour of pro EU and pro

Ukraine resolutions, parties on the fringe, such as the Left and the ESN tend to be much more

sceptical of such votes. France demonstrates this clearly. While French MEPs are scattered

throughout the different groups, the largest concentration is within the PfE, where 29 members of

their 81 total seats. In resolution RC-B10-0191/2024 (howtheyvote.eu, 2024a), of the present

French PfE members, 100% voted against the resolution, which is not unusual for similar

resolutions. This was not unique for the French PfE members, as 75% of the PfE members

present voted against the resolution, with 25% abstaining. One of the MEPs voting no was the

French Jean-Paul Garraud of the PfE, where he used a desire to seek peace in order to

delegitimise military aid to Ukraine. This was achieved by presenting military spending as war

escalation instead of defence “The Russian Ukraine conflict recalls the urgency of focusing on

one objective; peace. We need to use all of our energy to achieve that. We have a president in the

United States who's coming to the end of his mandate and he is pushing the west toward

escalation by allowing long range missiles to be shot into Russian territory. And this is far from

any peaceful solution and he is preparing his people for a terrifying prospect of the conflict

turning nuclear (...) We only have one priority and that is peace. A negotiated and firm peace

which respects the sovereignty of nations and we need to focus on the interest of people over

everything else” (Garraud, 2024). By presenting peace and weapons as opposites, he attempted

to gain a moral high ground, framing the refusal to support Ukraine as humanitarian (Garraud,

2024) . This view was in no way unique to the PfE, as several other members of the fringe group,

such as Özlem Denirel, German member of the Left, argued very similarly. Like the PfE, the Left

also voted majority no with only 13% of members voting yes. The arguably most extreme of the

eight groups, the ESN, similarly voted no, with only a single member voting in favour of the

resolution. ESN member Petar Volgin supporters of Bulgaria justified their overwhelming no by

urging caution of a third world war, saying “(...) the EU leaders turn a blind eye to the biggest

threat. The threat of a third world war. It seems a reality because the US and its European vassals

allowed Kiev to use long ranged missiles against Russia. And no, this will not help Ukraine. If

the policy of fueling the war goes on. The only outcome will be a Russian response that will

make a strike with a supersonic oreshnik missile look like a festive fireworks.” (Volgin, 2024).

Like Garraud, Volgin too is using peace rhetoric in order to delegitimise the Ukrainian cause,

similarly seeking to gain a moral high ground by highlighting the destruction and death

following an escalated war (howtheyvote.eu, 2024a).

Horseshoe theory is a theory within political science that has frequently been criticised due to it

being overly simple (Voets, 2022). However, an analysis of the French presidential election in

2022 suggests it has some merit in the context of the war in Ukraine. The theory states that

far-right and far-left political groups tend to agree on similar issues but for different reasons. As

observed by the Institute for a Greater Europe, the political centre and the extreme clash during

the election regarding the United States and NATO. The centrist candidates, such as Macron,

consistently favoured European coordination and partnership with NATO and the US. On the

other hand, Mélenchon of the far-left, and Le Pen of the far right both shared scepticism of such

cooperation despite their ideological differences, after the invasion (Voets, 2022). This is

mirrored by votes on anti-Russia resolutions in the EU parliament. The Left in the European

Parliament often vote against additional military aid due to concerns about NATO expansion,

imperialism, and similar issues, whereas the PfE and ESN vote against such legislation due to

national sovereignty concerns and in opposition to European centralisation efforts.

The roll-call analysis shows that political groups have a greater effect on a member's vote than

nationality; however, this does not mean that nationality has no effect. In the same vote, the

Left's 13% 'yes' voters were all from Nordic members. This pattern was repeated in the

previously mentioned 2023 and 2024 reports on Ukraine, where the small minority of Left

members who voted in favour of the resolution was once again exclusively Nordic. In neither of

these votes has a Nordic member of the Left voted no. In both of the votes, every single

Scandinavian, bar one single abstain, voted in favour of the resolutions despite their groups.

Malta is another example of this. The six Maltese MEPs are equally divided between the S&D

and EPP, both generally centre and pro-Europe. The six Maltese members, however, tend to go

against their groups by either abstaining or voting no, often being the only members of their

groups to do so (howtheyvote.eu, 2024b.)

In the same two different resolutions, Hungary is an interesting outlier where the majority of

votes come from PfE and ESN MEPs; however, in both cases, we see a few abstentions. In

contrast, a substantial proportion of both ESN and PfE MEPs did not vote. This could be

reasoned as a consequence of the Hungarian government's Eurosceptic leadership as seen in

Reuters (2025). Despite nationality at times affecting a country's votes as proven by the

aforementioned examples, they are outliers. For the majority of countries, individual groups

affect votes much more than nationality.

While the thesis' roll-call analysis reveals that MEPs vote overwhelmingly by ideology rather

than nationality, this does not necessarily contradict the Neoliberal Institutionalist premise of

State Centrism. The Parliament acts as the main forum for political ideology and expression;

however, the Council is the organisation with the ability to mobilise the EPF and enact sanctions,

which itself operates on a state centric basis (European Council, 2017). The mechanisms this

thesis has identified as necessary for maintaining unity, like Constructive Abstention and the

Silent Procedure, are tools to manage the interest of countries instead of parties. A perfect

example of this is the EU concessions regarding the Druzhba oil pipelines which were given to

specific countries based on the reality of their infrastructure and strategic location, not their

political affiliations.

While internal factors such as neutrality and energy dependence explain particular voting

behaviour, these factors are widened by external international pressures. This opens up the

discussion regarding the role and actions of non-EU actors, specifically Russia's and America's

influence targeting either specific political parties, the U.S. political shifts that alter strategic

focuses of the crisis from helping safeguard Ukraine to seeing a peace treaty, no matter the loss.

5.4. Russia and Central European illiberal actors

While ideological differences naturally provide internal divisions within any union,

investigations have shown that the split in the EU regarding the Ukraine war is not solely

internal, but also comes from external sources in a type of hybrid warfare. The main culprit of

externally imposed division in the EU is Russia, chiefly due to the EU being the main supporter

of Ukraine, but also because it is in the Federation's best interest to keep Europe divided and

unable to stand united against it.

Franziska Wagner, Liliia Sablina & Bálint Mikola (2024, pp. 159-190) explore the mutual

relationship and legitimation strategies between the Russian state and illiberal Central European

actors such as Austria with the FPÖ or known as the Freedom Party of Austria and Hungary with

Fidesz. Over the past 15 years, the Russian state has cultivated ties with extremist and

Eurosceptic European political groups by utilising mutual legitimation strategies and sharing

similar narratives to strengthen their positions domestically and internationally (Wagner et al,

2024, pp. 159).The main strategy that Wagner et al. (2024, pp. 161-162, 173) use is the use of

legitimacy as a discursive feature, where political actors use language and narratives to justify

their actions. When this is used in a mutual sense, it would allow Russia to counter international

pressure and in the case of the European political groups, enable them to present a united front

against so-called “liberal democratic norms”.

The FPÖ's pro-Russian stance had developed primarily as an alternative to the EU and the West,

fueled by Austria's historical predisposition toward neutrality and its dependence on Russian

energy. The domestic politics of the FPÖ focused on criticising the government's economic

management and sanctions against Russia. The FPÖ, given Austria's energy dependence on

Russia, is a strong supporter of Russian energy. Blaming the EU and Austrian government for the

energy crisis and increased cost due to the aforementioned sanctions against Russia, arguing that

they are pointless and can cause more harm than success. However, the main political stance

remains neutrality as the FPÖ sees that it fits Austria (Wagner et al, 2024, pp. 162, 163,

167-168). Additional legitimation strategies and narratives that the FPÖ utilises is the framing of

rationalisation, by positioning its arguments and perspectives as logical and reasonable, aligning

them with economic experts and neutral states, it would give more credence to the party as a

political alternative. Other examples of narratives being dependency, national interest, rationality,

and responsibility. Responsibility is frequently used by the FPÖ in order to align with populist

discourse by blaming the government's actions, such as compromising Austria's neutrality

(Wagner et al, 2024, p. 168).

Fidesz's perspective shifted from economic pragmatism to openly and defiantly threatening to

veto EU sanctions against Russia while aligning its rhetoric with pro-Russian propaganda,

primarily when it reflects the Russian propaganda of the importance of peace. The party shares

ideological perspectives with Putin's regime, mainly anti-Western, Euroscepticism, and

anti-LGBTIQ+. This sympathy with Russia is made clear in Viktor Orbán's 2022 speech at the

31st Tusványos camp 2022, where he referred to the conflict as a clash of values, saying “……… we

do not want to tell them how they should live; we are just asking them to accept that in

our country a father is a man and a mother is a woman (...)” and “In this corner of the world

there will never be a majority in favour of this Western lunacy.” (Orbán, 2022). This mirrors the

words used by Vladimir Putin in his Address to the Federal Assembly 2023, where he states

“Look what they are doing to their own people. It is all about the destruction of the family, of

cultural and national identity, perversion and abuse of children, including paedophilia, all of

which are declared normal in their life.” and “We will protect our children from degradation and

degeneration". Both leaders use a victimhood narrative, presenting their countries as defenders of

traditional values against a more degenerated and decadent western world.

Fidesz uses the narratives of moral evaluation and rationalisation in the sense of condemning the

irresponsible Western reactions to Russia and appealing to the necessity of a peaceful resolution

in the conflict to safeguard economic interests. Other key narratives and strategies include

framing Hungary as a helpless observer in relation to international developments being subject to

global superpowers like the US, NATO or the EU, shifting the blame of the war to the US or

Ukraine, attributing economic hardship to the Hungarian opposition who support the sanctions

against Russia, presentation of a logical Russian military, and utilising statements from Russian

leaders or pro-government analysts without counter-views which lend external authority to

pro-Russian perspectives (Wagner et al, 2024, pp. 170-172).

Russian state media, particularly Izvestia, use their platforms to legitimise Russia's foreign

policy for its national audience. The consistent pattern involves two main categories: a rational

discussion focusing on economic relationships and the negative effects of sanctions on Europe.

This is accentuated by the involvement of European partners such as the Austrian FPÖ and the

Hungarian Fidesz. The Russian media portrays Austria as a rational actor due to its non-support

of sanctions against Russia, but also mainly within the topics of sanctions, the aftermath of the

war, the consequences of sanctions, and sanctions on Russian gas/energy. Russian media also

portray Hungary as a rational actor aligned with Russia, committed to economic relations,

primarily gas imports, and a particularly prominent issue is Hungary's opposition to sanctions.

(Wagner et al, 2024, pp. 165-176). Additional Russian media narratives and the legitimation

strategies frame European actors as non-sovereign satellites of the US/NATO while legitimising

actors like the FPÖ and Fidesz as the demonstration of real politics with concern for their

citizens, criticising EU politics as destructive, and utilises experts from countries that align or are

willing to align with Russian propaganda to justify the state's international actions (Wagner et al,

2024, pp. 170-176).

One of the most significant external sources of division is the scandal regarding the “Voice of

Europe", which did not just spread misinformation, but directly financed EU MEPs in a clear

case of corruption as exposed by BIS, the Czech security information service. The BIS revealed

a large network led by a famously pro-Russian Ukrainian oligarch named Viktor Medvedchuk,

who used the network based in Prague to funnel money to EU politicians. Politicians implicated

were several high-ranking AfD members, such as Maximillian Krah, as well as others from

prominent EU member states. The network primarily targeted far-right EU politicians, such as

AfD's Peter Bystron, who the BIS have recorded meeting and taking money from Artem

Marchevsky, another central figure in the Voice of Europe operation. The revealed corruption of

AfD members led to the collapse of the EU group Identity and Democracy, which was an attempt

to unify Europe's conservative parties. In its place came the PfE, filled with the less extreme

eurosceptic and right-wing parties, such as Hungary's Fidesz, and the Austrian FPÖ. This

allowed the parties to retain their reputation free from the tainted AfD. AfD, together with the

more extreme conservative parties, created the ESN, which consistently votes overwhelmingly

against resolutions condemning Russia (Becker, 2024).

5.5 USA and transatlantic cooperation

During the presidency of Joseph Biden, the United States of America was particularly

pro-Ukraine. Lakishyk (2024, pp. 1-10) notes that the Biden administration revitalised US-EU

cooperation compared to the last presidency. When the Russian invasion of Ukraine began in

2022, the US and EU swiftly coordinated on military and economic aid for Ukraine, while also

swiftly coordinating on economic sanctions against Russia. This crisis also revitalised NATO and

discourse about NATO membership in countries such as Sweden and Finland, which led to their

accession and prompted NATO members to meet defence spending requirements. The USA,

under the Biden administration, also helped the EU to reduce its reliance on Russian energy. The

USA significantly increased its LNG (liquid natural gas), a key energy source for many EU

countries. By late 2022, the US supplied nearly 50% of the EU's LNG, allowing the EU to cut

Russian energy imports drastically (Lakishyk, pp. 3-5). Despite high levels of cooperation

between the US and EU during the Ukraine crisis, several factors outside of Ukraine lead to

decreased trust and cooperation, such as differing policy, support for Israel/Palestine, the US

involvement in Afghanistan, China, trade, technology, etc. (Lakishyk, pp. 4-10).

During the presidency of Donald Trump, the pro-Ukraine status quo shifted dramatically. One of

the largest switches are from donations to purchases. The USA under Trump no longer provides

Ukraine with weapons for free, instead offering to sell arms to the EU for them to give to

Ukraine. This forces EU members to use their budgets to purchase American weapons (Spatafora

et al., 2025, p.6). Another important effect the US has on European decision making is his wish

to end the war by giving the occupied Ukrainian territories to Russia in exchange for peace. This

has further forced the EU's hand to send support packages and money to Ukraine (Spatafora et

al., 2025, pp. 20-21). This all shows a large shift from being a supporting force to the US's role

of main actor on the Ukrainian side, to replacing the US as the main actor due to an increasingly

unreliable USA.

5.6 Legal mechanisms

In order to be able to manage all of the decisions required by not only the war but other areas of

importance, such as economics, political developments, societal concerns, etc, the Council of the

European Union relies on the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper). This

committee is composed of ambassadors from all 27 member states, where these ambassadors

operate as the intersection of technical drafting and political negotiation. Other functions include

being the main preparatory body for the Council, making sure that decisions are largely agreed

upon before they reach the ministerial level of the European Union (EUR-Lex, 2021).

During the Ukraine war, the Coreper used the “Silent Procedure", found on article 12(1-3) of the

Rules of Procedure of the Council, in order to accelerate certain key decisions. This institutional

mechanism allows for a proposal to be automatically adopted if no member state objects in

writing by a specific deadline. For example, a legal text that is about a certain sanction would be

circulated with a certain deadline. If no objection is received by email at the deadline, then the

act is adopted. This mechanism is instrumental in ensuring rapid implementation of important

decisions such as sanctions or aid packages without being tied down by bureaucratic and logical

difficulties regarding decision-making (EUR-Lex, 2025b).

Another legal mechanism that could be used to resolve dissent within the EU is the concept of

Constructive Abstention where during a disagreement about the EPF's initial deployment,

Neutral states such as Austria, Ireland, and Malta faced domestic, constitutional, and/or political

hindrances that prevented them from directly aiding Ukraine militarily (Hoeffler, Hofmann and

Mérand, 2024). These countries proceeded to use Constructive Abstention in order to not prevent

willing member states from sending lethal military aid to Ukraine (Council of the European

Union 2023). Constructive Abstention is a legal mechanism in article 31(1) of the Treaty of the

European Union (EUR-lex, 2025a), which allows a member state to abstain from a vote without

blocking the decision, only if they accepted that the decision regardless of their input would still

make the entire Union commit to the decision.

5.7 Strategic costs

Other than political debates, international level decision-making is increasingly informed by

assessments regarding long-term economic impact of war done by research bodies and think

tanks. A 2025 study made by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and Corisk

presented a cost analysis for EU member states, comparing the costs of a Ukrainian defence and

a Russian victory. The report estimated that a Russian victory would bring forth a cost on Europe

between 1.12 trillion and 1.63 trillion euros over a four-year period. Included in these numbers

were the costs to manage a new refugee crisis as well as the necessity for a great increase in

military defence to secure the eastern border. The study also calculated that the cost of supplying

military and financial aid to Ukraine to prevent a Russian victory would be estimated at 522 to

938 billion euros. These projections show a significant economical difference, that the cost of

containing Russia and preventing a victory was about half the potential cost of a Russian victory

(Bjoertvedt et al., 2025, pp. 11, 23-26).

6. Analysis

In this section, the thesis will analyse the fifth research question of how did the EU manage to

create unity on policies. It will use the previously mentioned seven core premises of NLI and

then further elaborate over certain key institutional mechanisms that answer the question.

6.1. State centrism

In the context of the EU response to Ukraine, State centrism fits particularly well because of the

emphasis on states being important actors in decision-making and cooperation. That does not

necessarily mean that countries are not key in the integration, implementation, and/or

cooperation of those decisions that were made. An example of state centrism in practice within

the EU regarding unity management is the EPF's initial deployment where neutral countries such

as Austria, Ireland, Malta, faced domestic, constitutional and/or political constraints and

obstacles which prevented them from funding military aid. In a unanimity-based system, this

abstention or veto would normally paralyse the decision of sending EU wide military aid.

In order to solve this, the Council invoked article 31(1) of the Treaty of the European Union

(EUR-lex, 2025a), called the Constructive Abstention. The use of Constructive Abstention

ensured that the EPF could receive lethal aid from willing members, since abstaining members

would have their share of the economic contribution re-routed to exclusively finance non-lethal

aid such as medical kits, fuel, or ambulances (Council of the European Union, 2023). This

intricate institutional balance allows the EU to achieve a political unanimity while

accommodating legal sovereignty of its member states. It prevents the lowest common

denominator outcome, in this case the EU not sending any lethal aid, and allows a coalition of

the willing member states to commit within the EU framework rather than create their own

unique and expensive framework from scratch. This is an example of neoliberal institutionalism

where the international organisation utilises institutions to lower transaction costs of cooperation

while providing flexible mechanisms for a healthy dissension.

6.2. Sovereignty as a resource for international influence

Hungary is probably one of, if not the, member states that have been the most defiant and non

cooperative EU member. Under Minister Viktor Orbán, Hungary has acted as a primary internal

spoiler, utilising its veto power to block or delay decision to the fullest. However, according to

the framework of neoliberal institutionalism, this is not irrational behavior but rather a calculated

strategy of hostage-taking within an international setting. Hungary's obstructionism was rarely

about the specific foreign policy issue that was at hand. Instead, it was a negotiation strategy

(Müller & Slominski, 2025. pp. 11, 19). Hungary was facing the suspension of billions of euros

in EU funds due to its consistent breaches of EU Law. An example of this tactic would be how

Hungary vetoed an 18 billion euro aid package for Ukraine and the OECD Global Minimum Tax

directive in 2022 (Parliament EU, 2022). The goal of this veto was to force the Council to release

the frozen Cohesion and Recovery funds. By creating this hostage situation for the EU and

Ukraine, Orbán sought to increase the cost of non-payment for other member states involved

(Müller & Slominski 2025, pp.3-12).

The EU's response is a good demonstration of the strength of the unions' institutional order. It

did not splinter or back down, it engaged in complex internal negotiation and preserved the core

policy objective whilst managing the dissent. In late 2022, the EU brokered a deal with Orbán

where he agreed to lift the veto on the Ukraine 18 billion to Ukraine. In return, the EU approved

that Hungary's Recovery and Resilience plan would be approved despite the money otherwise

being frozen. This was, however, still tied to certain democratic milestones (Kirkegaard, 2022).

The EU did still maintain the suspension of a portion of the Cohesion fund.

Following several issues such as the one already mentioned, the EU established the Rule of Law

Conditionally Regulation, which was groundbreaking. The rule provided the Union with an easy

to use economic sanction against a member state, which changed the bargaining power between

dissenting members and the council. Strengthening the Union by giving it a way to punish

internal deviance has had mixed results. Orbán has been unable to delay in the same way as in

the past without feeling the consequences of it, and aid to Ukraine has subsequently flowed

smoother. However, by fully agreeing to what the EU dictates would make him go against his

official public position, which might lose him popular support at home. This means that the rule

works up to a point since economic sanctions hurt, but losing power hurts more (Koranyi, 2025,

1-28). The whole scenario was a perfect representation of a member state using their sovereignty,

in this scenario their right to veto, in order to exert their own influence over the union and come

out with a better deal than they would previously have gotten.

6.3. Predominance of political influence over military force

The Ukraine war challenges the premise of political influence over military force, yet the EU's

response remains consistent with this premise. Even when the EU have been forced to become a

military power, they have done so not by blatant army creation, but rather through political and

institutional mechanisms. The EPF perfectly demonstrates this, because rather than member

states solely acting on their own accord, the provision of lethal aid to Ukraine was instead

channeled through a centralised financial mechanism that is regulated by the Council. This, for

all intents and purposes, institutionalised the military response of European member states. This

turned the delivery of weapons into a process that was governed by a legal framework,

reimbursement rules and political consensus (Genini, 2025, pp. 6-13).

Additionally, the EU utilised its economical position as a substitute for direct military

intervention against Russia, as seen in the 6th sanction package, where the EU leveraged its

market power to coerce Russia. By negotiating the ban on seaborne oil all the while managing

the exemptions for the Druzhba pipeline-dependent member states such as Hungary (Spike,

2022), the EU prioritised political cohesion over maximising the economic impact against the

Russian military. This aligns with the NLI premise that even in security crises, the most effective

response is politically negotiated and institutionally bound, rather than determined by raw

military capabilities.

The EU in its very conception is an international organisation that is heavily reliant on

democratic principles of negotiation, fostering the maintenance of peace through diplomacy, so

member states reflect this by primarily using diplomacy both internationally and internally,

following legalisation which is essentially following precise rules within an institution and

adhering to third party adjudication. As the findings chapter have shown, this is particularly valid

in the case of the Ukraine war, where both the individual member state and the EU as a whole

primarily responded to the crisis economically with sanctions targeting everything between

specific national individuals to international state actors, diplomatically supporting Ukraine

while denouncing and isolating Russia and their allies, even sending aid packages that can

comprise humanitarian aid, military aid, economic aid, financial aid, and more.

A great demonstration of this premise of neoliberal institutionalism in action is the 6th sanction

package negotiated in early 2022. It mainly proposed a ban on Russian oil imports, and

demonstrated how the EU uses economic warfare as their primary weapon against Russia, over

direct military force. While the majority of EU members agreed that the Russian military needed

to be defunded, the cost to the individual countries differed. While coastal nations such as the

Netherlands could easily import oil from overseas, countries such as Hungary do not have that

option, instead relying on oil pipelines, specifically, the Druzhba pipeline which brings Russian

and Kazakh oil to Hungary and other former communist republics in Eastern Europe. For such

countries, a complete ban on Russian oil would be incredibly detrimental to their economy. Due

to the unanimity rules of the EU CFSP, Hungary was able to stall negotiations for weeks. The

final agreement places a ban on seaborne crude oil and petroleum products but grants a

temporary exception for crude oil to be delivered by pipeline. The strategic outcome was that,

because an estimated 90% of Russian oil entering the EU arrived by sea, the ban remained highly

effective, while the political outcome was that Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic would

continue to receive oil via the Druzhba pipeline. Removing the immediate economic threat to

their regimes, allowing them to lift their veto on the sanctions. However, there were specific

derogations or suspension of the law under a particular circumstance. Bulgaria was granted

continued importation of seaborne crude oil until the end of 2024, due to a lack of infrastructure

and geographical location, and Croatia was allowed to continue import of Russian vacuum gas

oil until the end of 2023, because it was essential for the function of its refinery. This

compromise demonstrates how the EU follows the NLI premise that goals are best achieved

through economic and diplomatic management over military force (Spike, 2022; European

Commission, 2022a).

Ultimately, this compromise shows off the neoliberal preference for absolute gain, in this case

hurting Russia, even if it means a relatively uneven gain within the EU. Hungary and Slovakia

improved their relative economic positions by securing the exemption and are allowed to

continue to buy discounted Russian oil while their competitors within the single market paid a

premium for crude oil (Levi et al, 2025). However the council introduced anti-circumvention

clauses in order to mitigate the free-rider problem posed by future compromises like this one.

The clause covers how member states that benefit from the pipeline exemption were prohibited

from reselling such crude oil or petroleum products to other member states or third countries.

This so-called ring fencing, protected the integrity of the single market and ensured that the side

payment remained contained (European Commission, 2022a).

One of the exceptional institutional inventions of the EU during the conflict is using the EPF to

send military equipment to Ukraine. Doing this was working around the EU's own laws and the

constitutional neutrality of certain members. Article 41 of the Treaty on European Union

prohibits the Union itself from paying for military equipment. In order to work around this they

utilised the EPF, which officially is classified as an off-budget fund financed by the member

states instead of the official EU budget. This was originally meant to fund training missions in

Africa, but was turned into what is today essentially a war budget over a billion euros (Maletta

and Héau, 2022).

6.4. State and nonstate actors organised around institutional principles

and entities

On several occasions, this thesis has already demonstrated how both state and non-state actors

organised in and around institutional principles. On the state level, member states coordinate and

organise their own national interest through organisations such as the CFSP, Coreper, the EU

parliament, REpowerEU, and the EPF in Ukraine. The previously mentioned Voice of Europe

scandal demonstrates how non-state actors, such as Viktor Medvedchuk, attempted to manipulate

policy through the EU parliament's financial and organisational structures. When discovered, the

guilty parties did not simply disappear, rather reorganising within the institution. The parties with

guilty members, chiefly the AfD, shifted from a ID member to creating PfE and ESN. This

reorganisation shows that within a neoliberal framework, even parties trying to work against the

organisation must do so by existing alongside institutional principles and entities.

6.5. Mutual interest based on international cooperation

One of the main weapons of the war in Ukraine, specifically in the early years, has been energy.

The war exposed the EU members' dependence on Russian gas, and following supply cuts, each

state had a reason to hoard the gas they had. With many members doing this, however, the single

market would have crashed and made it expensive for all. In order to avoid such a situation, the

EU launched the REPowerEU plan in early 2022 as well as several emergency regulations,

which federalised energy policy. The establishment of the EU Energy platform combined

individual demand, unified them, and negotiated as one with alternative oil providers, which is

very much in line with the fifth premises of Neoliberal institutionalism. By acting like an oil

buyers union instead of having each member negotiate separately, the EU prevented EU

members from bidding against each other, thus increasing the EU's bargaining power (European

Commission, 2022b).

Another example of the EU following these premises is its initial choice to stand by Ukraine

when the war first began, as well as its continued support despite the economic backlash. Experts

and think tanks play an important role in quantifying costs as well as providing the information

for decision-making. As previously detailed in section 5.7, studies reveal that the cost of a

Russian victory would be nearly double the cost of continuing the current support for Ukraine.

From an NLI perspective, this changes the interpretation of EU solidarity. It shows that the

decision to support Ukraine was not solely in defence of democracy, but a rationally calculated

choice due to mutual interest. By investing in Ukraine's defences, EU members acted to avoid a

higher long-term cost stemming from a more threatened Europe combined with a new refugee

crisis. This aligns with the NLI premise that cooperation tends to be driven by the desire to

minimise possible future risks and secure absolute gains (Keohane, 2012, pp. 126-127, Forte dos

Santos, pp. 653-655).

Another similar rational cost analysis was with the decision to decouple the wider EU from

Russian energy, it was costly but would have been more costly due to the sunk cost fallacy of

European integration which dictated the response. The EU's energy markets are physically

interconnected with each other through a web of pipelines and cables. Attempting to disentangle

this web of complex systems in order to achieve national energy security for a member state was

and is technically unfeasible in the short term. Essentially, the mere existence of the EU single

market and the interconnected energy grid created a path dependence where it was too big and

too complex to reverse (Rabinovych, 2025). This financial incentive acts as a powerful carrot

that the EU uses to align national energy policies with the wider EU strategic objective of

decoupling from Russia.

6.6. International institutions as mediators of international cooperation

The primary mediators within the EU in the context of the Ukraine war are the European

Commission and the Coreper. These organisations are the main tools for combining political will

with technical necessity (EUR-Lex, 2021). However, the need for mediation implies that the

members are not always unified in every issue. At times in need of a rapid response, it can

compel the council to implement decisions quickly, which it does through the Silent Procedure

mechanism within the Council of the European Union, of which the Coreper is a committee.

While use of the Silent Procedure is viewed as an aggressive diplomatic move, it offers a

fast-paced decision-making mechanism that can force consensus and remove stalling as a tactic

(Thomson Reuters Practical Law, 2025).

Another example of the premise of international institutions as mediators of international

cooperation is the EU's ability to act as a mediator through flexible mechanisms like the

previously mentioned Constructive Abstention. This allowed the EU to mediate the conflict

between its security goals and the inherent neutrality of several member states by allowing these

member states to abstain from funding military aid, but instead to non-lethal contributions such

as medicine, fuel, ambulances, etc (Council of the European Union, 2023), the organisation

mediated the situation so that the willing and able countries could proceed with their agreed

security arrangements without compromising the neutrality of the legally unable members.

6.7. Peace, prosperity and freedom as the purposes of international

institutions

The EU's use of financial and legal mechanisms in order to defend democratic institutions and in

the context of Ukraine, the EU's actions are not just a charitable donation, but a rational

calculation to reduce security uncertainty and preserve geopolitical order derived from

democratic principles, and international law. This order was put under threat following the

invasion of Ukraine. As noted by Keohane (2012, pp. 128-129), institutions exist in order to

reduce uncertainty and ensure cooperation. A theoretical Russian victory would bring great

instability to the continent, and the decision to mobilise the Ukraine Facility as well as the EPF

can be seen as a defense against this. Bjoertvedt et al (2025) in his article Europe's choice

Military and economic scenarios for the War in Ukraine, showcases this rationality clearly where

they estimated that a Russian victory would cost the EU over 1 trillion euros in defense spending

and management of Ukrainian refugees, however if the EU continued support for Ukraine, it

would cost significantly less. By investing in Ukraine defense, the EU is guaranteeing the future

peace and prosperity of its own member states. The EU successfully aligned the normative goal,

which is freedom for Ukraine, with the rational interest of its member states, which is avoiding

the high cost of a chaotic geopolitical environment.

The EU is composed of twenty-seven member states with different national interests which,

especially now during the Ukraine crisis, causes clear internal divides. The issues causing said

divide are multifaceted, covering different energy dependencies, different states of economic

integration with Russia, and differing threat perception. These divides, on the surface, makes

desertion and disunity within the EU seem inevitable. Yet, our findings chapter has shown that

despite these divides, the EU managed to mobilise substantial sanctions packages, finance the

delivery of military, humanitarian, and financial aid to Ukraine, and, despite an economic

downturn, initiate a radical decoupling from Russian energy. By observing the EU's actions

during the Ukraine war through the lens of Neoliberal Institutionalism in the previous section of

this chapter, it becomes clear that EU unity was not the result of a simple alignment of national

interests, but of the neoliberal institutional infrastructure which is designed to manage

interdependence, reduce transaction costs, and facilitate commitment.

6.8 Summary to Analysis

The EU's response to its challenges both external and internal to the Ukraine crisis serves as an

example of how NLI works within an international organisation powered by its institutions.

Despite having severe internal differences, the union managed to hold itself unified due to its

institutional capacity to find compromise and unity. Reasons such as minimised transaction costs

due to the commission and Coreper, good management of dissenting members, maximised

flexibility, as well as information sharing amongst many other reasons. Other factors such as the

sunk cost of leaving the single market, legal order and energy grid create a powerful deterrent

against notions of leaving the EU and instead have given the EU leverage for cooperation

between member states.

7. Conclusion

The objective of this thesis is to analyse how an international organisation arrived at and ensured

a consensus in decision-making when under extreme security pressure, utilising the EU during

the Ukraine war as a case study. Through the framework of Neoliberal Institutionalism, this

study has sought to find the link between the political will for internal unity and the capacity to

achieve it by focusing on the micro-level mechanics of crisis management. The research

demonstrates that despite internal and external pressures, the EU managed to transition from a

soft power actor to a security provider by utilising specific institutional mechanisms.

This study posed five research questions which were aimed at understanding the dynamics of EU

cohesion. The findings allow for the following conclusions:

The trajectory of the development of the EU response happened in the time span of four years,

under which it rapidly shifted from emergency aid to employ the “Peace Through Strength"

strategy.

The main issues that caused disagreements were about the energy sanction and supply of lethal

military aid. Weaponisation of interdependence showed that member states that were more

reliant on Russian resources, particularly Hungary and Slovakia, consistently opposed full energy

bans due to the economic threat that it posed to their stability. For the EU to supply lethal

military aid to Ukraine, neutral member states such as Austria, Ireland, and Malta opposed it due

to their predisposition of neutrality as well as ideological opposition from the mainstream

European political parties from the far-left and far-right due to concerns of war escalation.

The study found that while national interests such as trade dependency influenced voting

behaviour, the main consistent predictor of voting patterns was political ideology, with certain

exception of outliers such as Hungary. The findings demonstrate horseshoe theory where, the far

left and far right political groups (e.g., The Left, PfE, ESN) in the European Parliament often

voted very similarly against certain resolutions, using “peace” narratives to delegitimize the

supplying of military aid, while more moderate and centrist groups (e.g., EPP, S&D, Renew)

remained unified in their support for increasing military aid to Ukraine.

External influence used the issues the EU faced as a wedge to fracture EU unity. Particularly

Russia engaged in mutual legitimation with other illiberal Central European actors such as the

FPÖ and Fidesz, utilising hybrid warfare tactics with the Voice of Europe scandal to finance a

pro-Russian narrative within the European Parliament. On the other hand, the United States also

was influencing the EU's strategic autonomy. While the Biden administration facilitated

cooperation with the EU, political shifts and the unreliability which is associated with Donald

Trump and his presidency, pushed the EU to seek greater independence from the USA.

The EU managed to create unity not by suppressing dissent, but rather by managing it through

institutional flexibility by using mechanisms such as the Silent Procedure, Constructive

Abstention, and the EPF. Additionally, the EU also managed to negotiate with dissenting

member states in order to prioritise political cohesion over economic uniformity. For example,

with Hungary and the Druzhba pipeline exemption.

The application of NLI to this case study illustrates that international institutions are essential for

reducing transaction costs and ensuring cooperation. The findings demonstrate the premises of

state centrism and sovereignty as a resource. While countries remain the main actors in

international politics, the analysis does demonstrate that sovereignty is not a barrier, but at times

used as a bargaining chip. This was demonstrated by the hostage taking strategy Hungary

utilised, where their veto power was used in order to unlock frozen EU funds. This shows that

obstructionism can be a strategy in order to gain national influence in an international

organisation such as the EU.

The research also demonstrates the NLI premises regarding institutional mediation and the

predominance of political influence over military force. Despite at times being compelled to act

as a security provider, members and non-state actors organised themselves around institutional

principles rather than resorting to raw military creation. By using institutions as mediators,

specifically Coreper and the Commission, the EU was able to institutionalise its military

response through the EPF. This in turn demonstrates that even in security crises, desired

outcomes are achieved best through political negotiation and legal structures instead of

uncoordinated state action.

The study also shows how the cooperation was driven by rational calculation of mutual interest,

serving the institutional purpose of peace and prosperity. The choice to support Ukraine lined up

perfectly with cost benefit analyses, which showed that the long-term cost of a Russian victory

far outweighed the short-term cost of sending aid. By unifying the goal of defending democracy

with the rational interest of economic preservation, the EU acted consistently with the NLI

premise that institutions exist to reduce uncertainty and secure welfare.

Overall, the Ukraine war acted as a catalyst for the European Union and its institutional capacity

for internal cohesion. This thesis concludes that the EU serves as a good example of institutional

resilience. By utilising institutional mechanisms like the Silent Procedure, Constructive

Abstention, the financial benefits of REpowerEU and the wider interconnected systems of the

union, the EU successfully transforms diverse national interests into a unified security actor. This

study concludes that even non-hegemonic organisations can generate hard power through

institutional soft-power mechanisms, offering a blueprint for regional governance in an

increasingly unstable global system.

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